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Abstract
This article argues that debates about public innovation among governance scholars risk essentialising the concept. Rather
than recognise the inherently normative content of public innovation, some scholars have created taxonomies that con-
flate very different forms of ‘innovation’ in the public and private sectors, the latter of which is deeply contradictory to
public values. We re-think public innovation as both a pragmatic process, a way of responding to developments in contem-
porary governance, and an inherently public and democratic practice. Our analysis addresses three points: who innovates;
what is the object of innovation, and what are the effects of innovation? From this analysis we specify public innovation
as both inescapable and democratically necessary to safeguard and promote the important values of public life.
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1. Introduction
Even a brief perusal of the public innovation literature
demonstrates that, apparently, innovation in the public
sector needs to be argued for. It is a common rhetori-
cal trope to contrast innovation in the private and pub-
lic sector, to consider the first inevitable, an intrinsic ele-
ment of the market, and to provide a list of character-
istics of government (bureaucratic, silos, monopoly or
monopsony, absence of incentives) to argue why public
innovation is supposed to be less likely (Potts & Kastelle,
2010; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). On the face of it, these
small rhetorical habits seem odd. Reform and innova-
tion have always been an intrinsic part of public ad-
ministration (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Merritt & Mer-
ritt, 1985; Moynihan, 2006; Weatherley & Lipsky, 1977),
from the days of Woodrow Wilson’s The Study of Ad-
ministration to Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing Gov-
ernment. Moreover, the sheer size of the literature on
public sector reform shows that the siren call of pub-
lic innovation is hard to resist (for a historical study see
Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). In the advanced, administra-
tive democracies of the West public innovation is a way
of life, a professional default state. It’s never difficult
to find something amiss with the workings of the po-
litical and administrative system, and the environment
in which governments operate keeps changing at dizzy-
ing speed. Who, then, does not want government agen-
cies to be more efficient, responsive, technologically in-
tegrated, and designed on the basis of scientifically ad-
vanced, expert knowledge (Margetts, 2010, pp. 26–27)?
Empirically, the affluent, well-organized administrative
states of the West are the result of more than a century
of patient, incremental, and sometimes radical, public in-
novation which combined changes in the organization
of state bureaucracies, the direct production and deliv-
ery of services, and progressive fiscal policies, often sup-
ported by Social-Democratic, Christian-Democratic, and
sometimes even Conservative politicians. The introduc-
tion of state-provided social insurance laws by Bismarck
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in 1883, the remarkable program of Social-Democratic
social housing construction and comprehensive urban
planning in Vienna between 1918 and 1934, the intro-
duction of the National Health Service in the UK in 1948,
were all large-scale, highly successful examples of pub-
lic innovation. Innovation in the public sector is, and has
always been, as commonplace as in the business sector.
So why the slight rhetorical display of defensiveness
in the recent academic literature? In arguing for ‘collab-
orative innovation’ for example, Hartley, Sørensen and
Torfing (2013) assert the need to ‘confront the myth
that the market-driven private sector is more innovative
than the public sector’, while Torfing and Triantafillou
(2016, p. 71) begin an empirical study of public innova-
tion stating they aim ‘to challenge the common under-
standing that innovation is something for the private sec-
tor only’. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion. So what does
the reader, given the ubiquity of public innovation, need
to be persuaded of? We will argue that public innova-
tion is above all a political process, but that this has been
under-emphasised in the literature. Most authors agree
that public innovation contributes to public value. This
implies that it stands in the service of sustaining and im-
proving democratic life. Our theoretical argument is that
in much public innovation literature (and practice) this
democratic, political dimension is either downplayed or
ignored altogether. This is because the starting point is
to argue that innovation is a private sector phenomenon,
and then assert that it can be a public one too (see for ex-
ample, Sørensen & Torfing, 2011, p. 846). We argue that
this potentially leads to importing an understanding of in-
novation based largely on managerialist understandings
of corporate efficiency and market value. Our argument
here is informed by a certain impatience with the innova-
tion ‘industry’ and its institutionalized amnesia: the pow-
erful administrative-academic complex that creates the
market for public innovation and produces the authori-
tative rhetoric to sustain it.
Our proposed solution is to begin by imagining in-
novation as a public good. Instead of starting by distin-
guishing public innovation from other types of innova-
tion commonly found in the ‘private’ sector, we suggest
innovation is an inherently public and democratic prac-
tice. Public innovation is both a ubiquitous feature of the
public sector and democratically necessary to safeguard
and promote the important values of public life. Our aim
is to subject the idea and ideal of public innovation to
critical interrogation, by exposing some of the assump-
tions that constrain its study, and to sketch a positive,
democratic theory of public innovation. Such a theory
is fashioned according to pragmatist principles of demo-
cratic experimentalism (Ansell, 2011; Healey, 2010; Hon-
neth, 2017, Chapter 3; Smiley, 1999). Pragmatist demo-
cratic experimentalism entails, in the words of Christo-
pher Ansell, “an open-ended process of refining values
and knowledge” (Ansell, 2011, p. 8).
This article is organized in five sections. First, we
show how existing justifications for public innovation
tend to rest on precarious grounds, unless innovation is
viewed as a democratic good. We then structure the sec-
ond, third and fourth sections around three questions
concerning public innovation: Who innovates? What is
the object of innovation? What are the effects of in-
novation? This helps us to build a critical perspective
on public innovation from multiple angles, focused on
the actors, objects and results of innovation. These
questions capture the originators of innovation (gov-
ernment, the corporate sector, citizens, societal organ-
isations, transnational bodies), its object (ideas, organi-
sations, behaviours, relations, technology), and the all-
important question of its intended and unintended ef-
fects, on government agencies, on officials, citizens, the
budget, and on society. We then recap our argument
and re-emphasise that if public innovation is not seen
first and foremost as about democratic experimentation
(Ansell, 2011), then academics (and practitioners) may
repeat the mistakes created through decades of man-
agerialism attempting to mimic private sector values in
a public sector context.
2. What Is Public Innovation?
In general terms “public sector innovation is about new
ideas that work at creating public value” (Mulgan, 2007,
p. 6). These ideas need to be sufficiently large and en-
during to constitute a recognisable break with past prac-
tices (Hartley, 2005, p. 27). They also need to be proac-
tively pursued by the originating actor (Sørensen & Torf-
ing, 2011, p. 849). This is an exceedingly broad definition
that includes many registers of political rule and public
administration. ‘New ideas’ include new ways of organ-
ising public sector organisations, new ways of financing
government (direct taxes versus user fees), new ways of
delivering public services (public delivery versus privati-
sation or public-private partnerships), new ways of orga-
nizing the relationship between different agencies of the
state (the centralization, devolution, or transnationalisa-
tion of governing powers), new ways of organising the
relation between citizens and the state (interactive gov-
ernment, citizen participation), the introduction of new
technologies (user-centred digital government), and so
on (see also Mulgan, 2007). As we will see later, in the lit-
erature on public innovation this broad definition is per-
ceived to have a universal quality in that it applies to all
political systems and cultures.
An important element of public innovation consists
of rhetoric. Not as a separate object or dimension of
innovation (as in Hartley, 2005, p. 28), but as an inte-
gral dimension that pervades the very activity of inno-
vation. Much public innovation is storytelling, acts of
meaning making, of making sense of an overwhelming,
unyielding and incomprehensible world. Through the al-
lure of evocative rhetoric indeterminate ambitions are
transformed into self-evident reform strategies that aim
at convincing communities of their authority and legiti-
macy. For example, the introduction of corporate man-
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agement techniques in public agencies became a strat-
egy to get “From Red Tape to Results” by “Creating a Gov-
ernment thatWorked better and Costs Less” (Gore, 1993;
Klijn, 2008). Or, by involving citizens in the design and im-
plementation of government programs in so called “in-
teractive government”, “governments can obtain whole-
ness, coherence, and effectiveness, taking into account
that governments no longer have the opportunity to di-
rect, command and exercise control over their citizens”
(Edelenbos & van Meerkerk, 2016, p. 1). The suspicion
that rhetoric is an essential performative dimension of
public innovation is further supported by its follow-up.
Hood and Dixon conclude, for example, that the debate
about public sector reform “is surprisingly ideological”
(2015, p. 5). Ironically, they also conclude that in the ab-
sence of serious evaluation studies “despite pious asser-
tions about the importance of evaluation”, even the eval-
uation of public sector reform has become part of the
rhetoric (Hood & Dixon, 2015, p. 5). The promise of re-
form trumps its results.
Much of the literature lists good reasons to make
the case for the necessity of public innovation. Grow-
ing expectations from stakeholders, growing ambitions
by elected officials and above all the complexity of a so-
ciety that is dominated by interconnectedness and un-
predictability (Bourgon, 2011; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011).
These are, however, almost always phrased in general
terms. Torfing and Triantaffilou (2016, p. 1), for example,
introduce the need for public innovation as a response
to “political challenges such as demographic changes,
increasing public health expenditure, unmet social de-
mands, a growing number of wicked problems and the
presence of numerous policy deadlocks”. Sørensen and
Torfing (2011, p. 847) refer to the need for public inno-
vation arising out of “rising expectations about the qual-
ity, availability, and effectiveness of public services” and
“growing ambitions in terms of the quality of public gov-
ernance and its ability to solve social, economic, and en-
vironmental problems”.
Societies, citizens and governments face real and seri-
ous challenges, such as climate change, fallingwages and
precarious labour contracts, the lack of affordable hous-
ing, crumbling infrastructure, the monopolistic domi-
nance of FAMGA (Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Google,
and Amazon) and its impact on society and democracy,
stagnating wages, tax evasion and avoidance by corpo-
rations and the rich, structural racism, gender bias, and
so on. Most of these challenges exceed the imagination
and governing capacity of governments and businesses
and certainly warrant changes in the organization and
process of governance. Our point, however, is a different
one. Making these ‘reasons for innovation’ explicit also
reveals their underlying political causes. In fact in quite
a few of them, the state is as much part of the problem
as the potential solution, bestowing upon the concept of
‘public innovation’ a less managerial and more politically
charged, meaning. In addition to these functional rea-
sons there are democratic reasons for continuous pub-
lic innovation. Liberal democracy is always poised be-
tween stability and disruption (Griggs, Norval, & Wage-
naar, 2014, p. 27). It is an inherent quality of democ-
racy that it will always fall short of its own high stan-
dards. As Griggs et al. (2014, p. 27) state: “the intrinsic
fallibility of democracy places the individual in a com-
plex ethical position. If we do not embrace a radical re-
jection of democracy because of its imperfections…we
have no alternative left but to take responsibility and try
to repair the imperfections or undo the shortcomings”.
In other words, public innovation is a defining character-
istic of democratic governance, and, as the quote sug-
gests, this ethical imperative extends to all citizens, not
just political society. Therefore, public innovation ought
to be viewed first and foremost as a public and demo-
cratic good, rather than a tool for problem solving (al-
though it might be both in practice).
3. Who Innovates in Public Innovation?
An obvious answer to our first question is: government
and its agencies. The elected officials and appointed ad-
ministrators who design and implement policy and pro-
vide public services; the political-administrative complex
of liberal elected democracy. A good example of this way
of thinking is the work of Sørensen and her collabora-
tors. Public service innovations have moved towards the
centre of attention with governments at all levels as well
as with Public Administration scholars (for an overview,
see Agger, Bodil Krogh, & Sørensen, 2015). This is particu-
larly the case in Northwestern Europe (Agger et al., 2015,
p. 3). Public service innovation takes place within the in-
stitutional framework of electoral liberal democracy. The
decisions of politicians regarding the direction and pri-
ority of public services reflect not only what they “per-
ceive to be right, just and valuable for society” (Sørensen,
2017, p. 4) but also how they frame the relationship be-
tween citizens, or more precisely different groups of cit-
izens, and the state, the relationship between the state
and the corporate world, and the role and position of the
nation state in the international order. Sørensen further
argues for political innovation as a complementary to
public sector innovation. Political innovation takes three
forms: changes in “the institutional arrangements that
regulate and authorize actors to govern a political com-
munity” (‘polity’), changes in “the process throughwhich
policy-making takes place in practice within a given set
of political institutions” (‘politics’), and changes in “de-
liberate efforts to develop and promote new political
visions, goals, strategies and policy programs” (‘policy’)
(Sørensen, 2017, p. 4).
These programmatic statements are as revealing for
what they leave out as for what they contain. As is
clear from the above summary this work is charac-
terised by a certain statist viewpoint. This might ap-
pear surprising as collaborative governance is nowa-
days presented as a distinct innovation paradigm in
addition to market competition and organizational en-
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trepreneurship (Ansell & Torfing, 2016; Hartley et al.,
2013; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). However, the elabora-
tions and examples of collaborative innovation demon-
strate that collaboration is either a form of coordina-
tion between government agencies, public servants, in-
traorganizational networks of public managers, public-
private networks, and internet-supported “crowdsourc-
ing”, a form of government-invited participation (Hart-
ley et al., 2013, pp. 825-826). Innovation, Hartley et al.
(2013) argue, is innovation in the public sector, and the
public sector is defined in terms “of a collective effort
to produce and deliver public value that is authorized or
sponsored by federal, state, provincial, or local govern-
ment” (Hartley et al., 2013, p. 822). However, this defi-
nition excludes some of the most interesting and signifi-
cant forms of public innovation.
Vigoda (2002), for example, makes a plea for a move
from responsiveness as a guiding value of public admin-
istration to collaboration. However, perhaps because of
the contrast with the unidirectional, passive connota-
tions of responsiveness, Vigoda (2002, p. 529) frames
collaboration decidedly in democratic terms: “[collabora-
tion] means negotiation, participation, cooperation, free
and unlimited flow of information, innovation, agree-
ments based on compromises and mutual understand-
ing, and a more equitable distribution and redistribution
of power and resources. According to this utopian analy-
sis, collaboration is an indispensable part of democracy”.
Vigoda elaborates his inclusive definition of collabora-
tion between governments and citizens by delineating
a continuum of roles, ranging from ‘citizens as subjects’
to ‘citizens as owners’. Vigoda’s democratic definition of
collaboration bears resemblance with the literature on
deliberative systems (Mansbridge et al., 2012) and Type
II democratic deliberation (Bächtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo,
Steenbergen, & Steiner, 2010). Both emphasize “a talk-
based approach to political conflict and problem solv-
ing” and realize that for this to work these ‘systems’
must be both dispersed and democratically inclusive
(Mansbridge et al., 2012, pp. 4–5). Similarly, Vigoda’s
continuum of citizen roles resembles the distinction be-
tween “government-induced” and “bottom-up interac-
tive governance”. The first is a form of citizen participa-
tion that is “strongly organized by governments”; the sec-
ond involves all kinds of civic initiatives (Edelenbos & van
Meerkerk, 2016, p. 2).
At least since the late 19th century days of Guild
Socialism, citizens have been restless innovators, who,
uninvited, organize themselves to manage their work-
places and neighbourhoods, produce social goods, and
provide innovative ideas about the organization of soci-
ety and the economy (Hirst, 1994, p. 105). They usually
do this in socially and democratically innovative ways,
transforming relations between individuals and social
groups and empowering people who feel abandoned by
the state (Claeys, 2013; Moulaert, Maccallum, & Hillier,
2013, p. 40; Wagenaar, 2016). The innovative potential
of these initiatives resides precisely in the fact that they
originate in the “free spaces” of civil society (Evans &
Boyte, 1986). If we broaden our geographical horizon
then we discover that Latin America is a breeding place
for citizen-initiated innovations. As Avritzer notes, de-
mocratization in Latin America was spurred by “partic-
ipatory publics”. He describes a process, largely similar
in most Latin American Countries in which community
groups associate to address “contentious issues”, subse-
quently transform “informal public opinion into a forum
for public deliberation and administrative decision mak-
ing”, and finally design and negotiate with the author-
ities “institutional formats” for the outcomes of these
participatory initiatives (Avritzer, 2009, p. 7). Avritzer em-
phasizes the role of participatory publics in providing “a
democratic and participatory response to the problem of
administrative complexity” (Avritzer, 2009, p. 137). Simi-
larly, NGOs are in the business of public innovation, often
setting agendas, designing solutions, formulating quality
standards, and forging new forms of collaboration in ar-
eas such as fighting climate change, supporting refugees,
and restricting worker exploitation in global production
chains. The importance of NGOs is that they often oper-
ate at the level of global governance.
The above examples suggest there is more than a
mere definitional issue at stake here. The statist bias in
the definition of public innovation obscures from view
some of the most important forms of public innovation
and their effects. It draws a priori boundaries around the
reach of democracy within public innovation, thereby ar-
bitrarily limiting the possibilities for democratic renewal.
Moreover, it can obscure more private sector-focused
understandings of public innovation that drive a private
takeover of the public sector (Bowman et al., 2013).
4. What Is the Object of Innovation?
There is a tendency in the public innovation literature
to essentialise public innovation. Essentialism is the doc-
trine that “objects have certain essential properties,
which make them one kind of a thing rather than any
other” (Sayer, 2000, p. 82). The rhetorical impulse in the
literature to define, categorize, and anatomise public in-
novation are, to our mind, ever so many attempts to es-
sentialise it. While there is in principle nothing wrong
with categorizing and finding (or declaring) similarities,
for various reasons essentialism is risky in the social sci-
ences. The first risk is that claims about sameness are
mistaken. They may involve non-existent similarities or
denials of significant differences. (Sayer, 2000, p. 83). For
example, as we saw earlier, the definition of public inno-
vation is so broad and involves so many different insti-
gators, objects, goals, strategies and outcomes that one
might genuinely question if it can be considered a co-
herent category in the first place. Taken to its extreme,
the current rise of populism would fall within this defi-
nition of innovation. The purpose, or perhaps it is bet-
ter to speak of the effect, of the habitual abstract defi-
nitions and categorizations is the use of the concept of
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public innovation outside its relevant context, its deno-
tation as a clearly identifiable, stable and by implication,
manageable, activity, that can be appliedmore or less un-
problematically in different contexts. This kind of essen-
tialisation shows itself, for example, in common vocab-
ulary of ‘design’, ‘tools’, ‘restructuring’ and ‘leadership’
that suggest a requisite measure of control in instigating
and implementing innovation (Edelenbos & van Meerk-
erk, 2016; Hartley, 2005; although Hartley et al., 2013,
are careful to emphasize the open-ended and contingent
nature of public innovation).
There are different problems with these taxonomies
that transcend mere definitional or linguistic habits.
For one thing, it raises the issue of validity. Valid-
ity implies the accurate relation between thought and
action, and at this point the rhetoric loses its inno-
cence. To what extent are the characteristics of an
innovation—New Public Management (NPM), interac-
tive governance, government-driven democratization,
participatory publics—an accurate reflection of what is
happening ‘on the ground’? The most likely answer is
that the relation is at best tenuous. Ideals are indications
of how we would like the reality in organizations, neigh-
bourhoods or cities to look like. It requires considerable
and sustained collective effort to get there. We will re-
turn to this later.
The second problem is moral equivalence. Every clas-
sification is a simile of the great taxonomies of Enlight-
enment botany and zoology. Taxonomy is meant to be
morally neutral; the genus and species are entries in
the book of nature, wholly outside ethics. However, for
three reasons, this ethical quarantine cannot be trans-
ferred to public innovation. First, public innovation is
by definition an attempt to improve the world of gover-
nance and public administration by making it more ef-
ficient, equitable, responsive, integrated, innovative or
democratic. These are big values and some forms of in-
novationwill realize these values better than others. Sec-
ond, some realizations will promote some values over
others, creating contradictions in the relative weighing
of values in the public domain (Margetts, 2010, p. 41).
For example, in many public service systems the em-
phasis on economic efficiency in the context of NPM
has favoured budgetary restraint and public competi-
tion over service coordination and deliberation (Wage-
naar, Vos, Balder, & van Hemert, 2015). Or, the emer-
gence of innovative and responsive citizen cooperatives
has eroded universalism in public service delivery (Wage-
naar, 2015). Third, implying moral equivalence ignores
the power differentials between actors in the public in-
novation arena. Much public innovation involves the
transfer of rights, money and powers by public actors to
corporate actors. This is of a wholly different order than
sharing power with citizen groups. We will return to this
point when we discuss unintended effects.
However, apart from problems of essentialism, the
question remains: What, in concrete situations of pub-
lic administration, is the object of public innovation? Is it
more effective,more efficient service delivery? Better co-
ordination between government agencies? More inclu-
sive local decision-making? A change in the relation be-
tween officials and citizens? A smaller state? The institu-
tionalization of participatory governance? What exactly
is it that needs to change? Let’s look at a somewhat ex-
tended example.
NPM is as good an example as any of a public in-
novation. With hindsight, NPM is arguably the most sig-
nificant and widespread public innovation of the last
30 years. Its ethos and vocabulary of corporatemanageri-
alism has enthralled governments around the world. Its
repertoire of techniques—performance indicators, out-
sourcing, performance-related pay, auditing, consumer
boards—has changed the face of public service delivery
in many countries (Hood & Dixon, 2015). Although it is
generally described as an innovation in public adminis-
tration, its objectives of radically reconfiguring the rela-
tionship between politicians, officials and themarket are
deeply political. The origins of NPM have to be found in
the writings on public choice, a blend of dysphoric cri-
tique of big government and the application of microeco-
nomic theory to public administration (Buchanan, 1988;
Niskanen, 1971). For 15 years these ideas were debated
and developed in relative quiet until Osborne and Gae-
bler published their famous book which functioned as
an ‘instruction manual’ for NPM. In these 15 years the
economic-political order underwent a profound neolib-
eral transformation (Crouch, 2011; Streeck, 2017) that
prepared the ground for the ideas of NPM to be put into
effect. In hindsight, the time was right; a policy window
had opened for the ideas of Niskanen, Buchanan, Os-
borne and Gaebler. In clear, concise language, unencum-
bered by economic theory, Osborne and Gaebler laid out
a blueprint for a government that promised a smaller yet
more effective government than is required by the direct
delivery state. It contained a catchy ‘logo’ (‘steering not
rowing’) and concrete instructions of how to reorganize
the public sector according to corporate andmarket prin-
ciples (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Numerous ‘ThirdWay’
social-democratic governments who saw NPM as a solu-
tion to the conservative challenge that ‘government is
the problem, not the solution’, enthusiastically adopted
their ideas. NPM contained the promise to shrink govern-
ment outlays, maintain a required level of service to the
public, and sport a modern, rational, decisive image by
adopting corporate management techniques. “Creating
a government that worked better and cost less” (Gore,
1993; Hood&Dixon, 2015), rapidly acquired the status of
a valence idea. The result was a reframing, a resetting of
expectations, of what citizens can expect from the state,
a reconfiguration of state relations with citizens and cor-
porate actors, an extension of corporate influence in civil
and personal life spheres, and a hollowing out of demo-
cratic accountability through an acceleration of the pri-
vatization of public services.
We could probably tell a similar tale about the vicissi-
tudes of three decades of interactive government (Voor-
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berg, Bekkers, & Tummers, 2015). The point is not about
the specifics but the plot of the narrative. Convenient la-
bels such as ‘NPM’, ‘interactive government’, or ‘public
value management’ suggest more ideological and strate-
gic unity than is warranted. Public innovation is more
a social movement or a historical trend—contingent,
emergent—than a coherent program. Christopher Hood
and Ruth Dixon did us a great service by compiling a de-
tailed overview of thirty years of public innovation in the
UK. Theirs is a story of restless improvements and innova-
tions that span thewhole gamut frompolitical restructur-
ing to changes in delivery systems. Devolution to regional
parliaments is followed by the (financial) autonomy of lo-
cal government. The shape and functioning of the admin-
istrative bureaucracy is shaken up by the creation of in-
dependent regulators and political civil servants. Many
bureaucracies were split up into agencies and then con-
solidated again. At the same time state public sector bu-
reaucracies introduced corporate management arrange-
ments. A large number of state companies and agen-
cies were privatized; core public services, such as public
transport, health, adult care, and energy and water pro-
vision, have been contracted out to private sector com-
panies (Hood & Dixon, 2015, pp. 20–43). With some ef-
fort we could probably put together a similar story of in-
cessant innovation in countries such as the Netherlands
and Denmark (with more emphasis on interactive gov-
ernance and government-initiated citizen participation).
The birth and worldwide adoption of NPM or interactive
government show similarities to the contingent agenda
setting processes as described by John Kingdon where
parallel streams of ideas, ideologies, and political devel-
opments interact in unpredictably ways while policy en-
trepreneurs restlessly circle the halls of government try-
ing to pounce on the right moment (2011). The key point
is that in all these instances most of these innovations
are instigated without being part of a larger plan. They
are reactive and pragmatic; their rationality is largely af-
ter the fact.
Public innovations are not straightforward applica-
tions of an impulse to improve the functioning of our
administrative apparatus, as most definitions of public
innovation imply. Instead they are the contingent out-
comes of human agency, ideological enthusiasm, strate-
gic one-upmanship, and historical development. They
try to solve a locally or nationally bounded problem,
their content inspired by some ideology (of a better and
smaller government, as in the case of NPM), an opportu-
nity for strategic advantage (as in ThirdWay innovations),
a more responsive and democratic form of governance
(as in the case of interactive or collaborative governance),
a reshuffling of the roles and responsibilities of state, cor-
porations and civil society in delivering public services, or
a mix of the above, with little anticipation of, and inter-
est in, the future effects of the change, but with a keen
eye on presenting them as rational, reasoned improve-
ments of government practices. Some of these local in-
novations aggregate into amore coherent movement, to
which a professor or policy entrepreneur attaches a label
and a storyline that appeals to a receptive audience.
5. What Are the Effects of Public Innovation?
Clearly, many good things have followed from the ef-
forts of politicians and officials to improve the function-
ing of government. The high quality of life in North-
western European democracies testifies to that. But, as
that shrewd observer of public policy, Aaron Wildavsky,
wrote 40 years ago, policy is its own cause (Wildavsky,
1979). Why is that? The answer, in today’s terms, is be-
cause every policy space is a complex system, where in-
teraction effects and positive and negative feedback cre-
ate wholly unpredictable system dynamics that quickly
overwhelm policy makers (Teisman, van Buuren, & Ger-
rits, 2009; Wagenaar, 2007; Waldrop, 1992). Most of
these “emergent effects” are unforeseen; some are pos-
itive (Hood & Dixon, 2015) but many of them undesired
by at least some of the relevant stakeholders (6, 2001).
Given the high risk of unforeseen negative consequences
following interventions in the social order, public inno-
vation aggravates that risk by its ambition to overhaul
whole systems of public administration.
The above point makes another of Wildavksy’s obser-
vations particularly pertinent: the Law of Large Solutions.
“The Law of large Solutions implies that the greater the
proportion of the population involved in policy problem,
and the greater the proportion of the policy space occu-
pied by the supposed solution, the harder it is to find a
solution that is not its own worst problem” (Wildavsky,
1979, p. 63). Our position is that public innovations have
real world consequences for citizens, communities, third
sector organizations, public sector employees, and lo-
cal administrations. They define their relationship to the
state, and the possibilities for just and effective gover-
nance and service delivery. Moreover, the types of pub-
lic innovation are not morally neutral, the effects of in-
novation can and should be assessed within the norma-
tive framework of Western democracy, and as a result
of such assessments we need to distinguish between ef-
fective and less effective innovations (Hartley, 2005) as
well as between more and less desirable forms of public
innovation. For reasons that are rooted in the two pre-
ceding challenges, we argue that the outcomes of public
innovation should occupy the top of the public innova-
tion agenda.
In one of the few systematic studies of the effects
of administrative modernization, Hood and Dixon (2015)
emphasize the diversity of impacts. What effects can we
expect? First, and most straightforwardly, history is full
of political innovations that served ignoble or repres-
sive purposes. The discovery and perfection of modern
media—at the time wireless radio broadcasts—as a tool
for propaganda by the National-Socialist regime is just
one example. The use of advanced search and data stor-
age technology for the mass surveillance of citizens is an-
other. On a much smaller scale, Wagenaar, Amesberger
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and Altink (2017) report the use of innovative coordina-
tion tools in local administration that are used to entrap
sexworkers. Governments hitch on to new technology to
expedite the process of government, both for benign and
pernicious purposes. On the basis of perceived threats
to its integrity, every state divides its population in de-
serving and undeserving groups (Edelman, 1988), and it
deploys its full panoply of discourse, technique and in-
novation to check, contain or, ultimately, eliminate such
groups (Wagenaar, 2015).
A second possibility is the absence of desired effects.
Although the reform initiative is genuine, and stakehold-
ers engage enthusiastically, the outcome may neverthe-
less be disappointing. This is the pattern of much in-
vited participation of citizens in the design, implementa-
tion and delivery of policy programs. Although there are
some spectacular examples of successfully institutional-
ized participatory efforts (the Porto Alegre participatory
budgeting initiative is the most cited showcase), many
of them have disappointing outcomes. The reasons are
manifold. Avritzer ascribes the success of the Porto Ale-
gre experiment to a favourable confluence of political cir-
cumstances. Similar experiments in Belo Horizonte and
Sao Paolo were much less successful (Avritzer, 2009). In
our study of governance-driven democratization in The
Hague we encountered many small organizational obsta-
cles, many of them the result of earlier NPM reforms,
that prevented the voice of citizens to be heard in munic-
ipal agencies (Wagenaar, van Schijndel, & Kruiter, 2010).
Sometimes it is the government’s obligation to protect
constitutional values and procedures that constrains of-
ficials’ possibilities to transfer executive power to citizen
groups. For example, the disappointing results of a more
participatory approach to social care in the Netherlands,
is credited to the government’s legally prescribed obli-
gation to regulate and its inability to refrain from micro-
managing citizen initiatives (Linders, Feringa, Potting, &
Jager-Vreugdenhil, 2016). In both examples the expla-
nation for the disappointing outcomes of these innova-
tions resided in the systematic-structural conditions that
drove the public sector in those particular locations.
But even well intended public innovations generate
negative unintended consequences (Hartley, 2005, p. 32;
Hood & Dixon, 2015). For example, as with every pol-
icy intervention, the publicized benefits of an innovation
might never materialize. After a painstaking and difficult
compilation of data on the outcome of NPM reforms,
Hood and Dixon conclude that in the UK “running costs
rose substantially in absolute terms over thirty years,
while complaints soared” (2015, p. 178). What drove up
cost was not so much the wage costs of civil servants
but the “’outsourced’ elements of running costs, even
though outsourcing had tended to figure large in stan-
dard recipes for greater efficiency” (2005, p. 178). Hood
and Dixon conclude that “this is not exactly what ‘it said
on the tin’ of all those grandiloquent reform makeovers
aimed at containing costs and improving administration
for citizens” (2005, p. 178).
When Hood and Dixon conclude that the costs of
outsourcing had driven up the costs of government in
the UK, they overlooked a number of important nega-
tive unintended consequences of outsourcing. Bowman
and his colleagues at the Centre for Research on Socio-
Cultural Change at the University of Manchester have
done for outsourcing what Hood and Dixon did for NPM.
In a careful collection and analysis of hard-to-find data
they traced the effects of contracting out. First, Bowman
et al. (2015) estimate the annual turnover of the “pub-
lic service industry” in the UK at between £80 and £100
billion, the fastest growing segment in local government
(Bowmanet al., 2015, p. 3). Themore important question
perhaps is what effect this frenzy of outsourcing has on
the quality of government, and for thatmatter, of democ-
racy and society. In summary, the effects are a massive
transfer of public money to private corporations, a se-
rious decline of the availability and quality of essential
services, the intrusion of the extortionist practices of the
finance industry into the public sector, and the erosion
of democratic influence and accountability. For example,
contracting out is sold as a cost saving measure that si-
multaneously increases the quality of service delivery. If
that claim is made true then a £100 billion outlay (the
total of pubic service contracts to corporate providers) is
public money well spent. However, Bowman et al. (2015)
reveal a pattern of excessive profit-taking, without risk,
at the expense of the taxpayer and the workforce. The
reasons are that the return on capital for supplying ser-
vices to the state is much higher than that of suppliers
to private industry (Bowman et al., 2015, p. 45), the in-
dustry’s ability to obtain franchises that amount to a “lo-
cal monopoly for themulti-year duration of the contract”
(Bowman et al., 2015, p. 46), and the routine strategy of
private providers to save costs by cutting wages and hol-
lowing out labour contracts (Bowman et al., 2015, p. 53).
What about the quality of the outsourced services?
Unfortunately the picture is equally dismal. Using com-
plaints to the ombudsman and the number of judicial
review applications as their indicator of service quality,
Hood and Dixon find that both have increased over the
thirty years of NPM innovation in the UK. Bowman et al.
(2015) point to a pattern of routine failure in which the
co-dependent state and corporate sector shift the blame
to a weak surveillance and monitoring system and a sup-
posed lack of knowledge within the core executive (Bow-
man et al., 2015, p. 30). Perhaps the most toxic effect
of outsourcing is the colonization of the public sector
by the financial logic of corporate conglomerates. Most
private vendors are part of an opaque conglomerate of
holding companies and investment vehicles. These con-
glomerates are part of the world of equity markets and
global finance. Outsourcing companies are forced into a
game of debt-funded acquisitions to boost shareholder
value. The investment firm that owns the outsourcing
firm provides the debt for the acquisitions and sets ar-
tificially high margins that are booked as internal debt
and weaken the balance sheet of the subsidiary. Com-
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monly the subsidiary pays out high dividends to the par-
ent company, which are financed by loans that raise the
debt level of the outsourcing company, lower its earnings
before interest and tax, and effectively result in reduced
corporate tax liabilities (Bowman et al., 2015, p. 87). The
upshot of this is a huge transfer of taxpayer’s money to
the owners and shareholders of the outsourcing corpo-
rates and their parent companies.
6. The Precarious Politics of Public Innovation
What have we learned about public innovation, as it un-
folds ‘on the ground’? We draw four lessons from the
argument and examples in the preceding sections. The
fact that public innovation happens everywhere, at all
times and with different intentions, as we saw above,
has two important implications for the academic ana-
lyst. First, it changes the very idea of innovation. Innova-
tion is less ‘intentional development’ andmore practical,
pragmatic, and usually local, problem solving. Recogniz-
ing the pragmatic nature of public innovation, Sørensen
and Torfing speak of a “complex, nonlinear, and often
messy” process (although they do project four distinct
phases onto this “messy” process; 2011, p. 852). The lan-
guage of practice is helpful here. If a policy intervention
is seen as a projection of intention into an unknown, and
often unknowable, future, then the effects of that in-
tervention are the result of backtalk, the agency of the
material-economic-political world. Most policy sectors,
as we have seen, are subject to the Law of Large Solu-
tions. Theworld has a complexity that far exceeds human
cognitive capacities. Not surprisingly, the effects of an in-
novative effort differ from the original promises and ex-
pectations; they fall short, are seen as disappointing or,
in case of perverse unintended consequences, as a policy
failure. This gives rise to many different and well-known
political responses: a reformulation of goals, blame shift-
ing, or controlling the political message through spin doc-
toring (Bowman et al., 2015; Hood & Dixon, 2015, p. 11;
Stone, 1997, p. 190). In some cases, officials embark on
an intervention that purports to improve the way pol-
icy is made or administration organized. This, often with
hindsight, is recognized as a public innovation, but for the
purposes of this analysis, we interpret it as a reaction to
the resistance that was provoked by the original policy in-
tervention. In practice terms: the resistance “denotes a
failure to capture the agency of the world” and the inno-
vation represents an accommodation to come to terms
with this resistance. The language is Pickering’s (1995),
who pictures this reciprocal process of intervention, re-
sistance and accommodation as a continuous, and in-
escapable, dialectic (1995, p. 23).
It is at this point that another important lesson from
the preceding analysis weighs in. In the realm of politics
and governance the dialectic of resistance and accommo-
dation is a dispersed interactive process in which an un-
known number of actors struggle with the agency of the
world and of each other. This subjects this dialectic to
endless processes of gaming and trying to get the bet-
ter of the other’s interventions. All these micro-activities
are ever so many moments of accountability, where ac-
tors assess the consequences of the change that is im-
posed on them and decide to support, resist or adapt
to it (Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2003). Eventually, this
dance of resistance and adaptation results in unforeseen
and unforeseeable outcomes, as its endless chain of ac-
tion and reaction ripples through the political and social
sphere. This is where intention and outcome meet. One
actor’s innovation is another actor’s invitation to move
into a field and neutralize a threat to one’s dignity, free-
dom, cherished life, work routines, moral worth or com-
munity cohesion, or redefine it as a business opportu-
nity and extract unjustifiable profits. So, the second les-
son is that we should not discuss public innovation with-
out taking its outcomes into consideration. This implies
that the analyst, in addition to, or instead of, acting as
an advocate, must act as a critical interpellator, similar
to the examples we gave in section two. Critical interpel-
lator implies that the analyst collects data and indicates
where they are not available, follows the money (Bow-
man et al., 2015) to the point where the strategic deci-
sions are made, and traces the effects of an innovation
to the point where the power to decide resides and the
gains of the innovation are harvested.
Third, the examples reveal another important, this
time substantive, lesson about public innovation: the fal-
lacy of moral equivalence. In section three we were criti-
cal of a certain essentialising tendency that we observed
in some of the literature on public innovation. As we
have seen, public innovation is defined so broadly and
harbours such a wide variety of interventions within its
conceptual boundaries (Hartley, 2005) that it is risky to
ascribe significant commonalities to it that define the
category of innovation in a uniform and coherent way.
As we saw when discussing the outcomes of innovation,
one actor’s innovation is another actor’s loss. Different
actors in the intervention enterprise have different inter-
ests and intentions. For example, public innovations that
involve corporate actors run a serious risk of being com-
promised by the logic of profit and shareholder value.
Several mechanisms create this corrosive influence. Not
only are public officials no match for the deep resources
and expertise of corporate actors, but also the public
prestige and the lure of generous remuneration of the
corporate sector are hard to resist. Apart from the eth-
ically dubious spectacle of ex-government officials tak-
ing lucrative jobs in the very industries they once over-
saw, this a priori favourable attitude towards business
explains some of the dynamics that led to the fatal co-
dependence between government and the public ser-
vice corporations that Bowman et al. observed (2015,
p. 7). Once companies have obtained the lucrative fran-
chises, the loss of the organizational and intellectual re-
sources for adequate service delivery proceeds quickly.
On a deeper level, the values and practices of the cor-
porate world are inimical to those of the public sector.
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This has serious consequences for the public sector as
we have seen. Not only does it lead to a transfer of tax
payers’ money to the corporate sector, but also to a de-
cline in the quality of service delivery, the replacement of
social by financial innovation, a hollowing out of adminis-
trative expertise, and an erosion of political transparency
and accountability.
Moreover, this transparency and accountability
deficit has acute implications for public engagement in
civic life. Colin Crouch’s (2004) Post-Democracy captures
how corporate influence in policy making, institutional-
ized through delegation of important resource decisions
to unelected agencies, hollows out the public sphere (see
also, Wolin, 2008). Since citizens can no longer see why
they ought to engage with public debate, they retreat, ei-
ther into the private activity of consumerism, or to ‘every-
day’ forms of protest and social media fuelled “connec-
tive action” (Bennet & Segerberg, 2013). This results in a
growing inequality between those who are able to nav-
igate the complex structures of distributed governance
and service delivery and canmake their voices heard (the
well connected higher middle class), and those who do
not and have becomemarginalized from crucial decisions
that impact on their lives (the disconnected ‘precariat’).
Public ‘innovations’ can be utilized to empower some
more than others in public management, and the already
well-connected often accumulate more power, while the
poorly connected lose out to a greater degree.
Perhaps most importantly, the colonization of the
public sector by corporate values and practices results in
a loss of the very spirit of the public sector. In proximate
terms this amounts to a loss of public value; in more dis-
tal, but ultimately more significant terms, in the loss of
a moral vision of a just and equal society in which every-
one regardless of their ethnicity, religion, gender or eco-
nomic position, finds security and the concomitant pos-
sibility to develop and improve themselves. In terms of
democratic governance, public and corporate interests
do notmix, whether it concerns health care, public trans-
port, libraries, prisons or universities. The money nexus,
with its core values of efficiency and ‘value for money’,
drives out most that is central to the values and practice
of the public sector and, ultimately, of democracy.
Where does this leave us with regard to the ideal
and prospects for public innovation? We do not deny,
of course, the necessity, and possibility, of improvement
in collective decision-making and service delivery, but
we frame this process differently. What we propose is a
process of guided change that is much more democrati-
cally embedded, distributed, pragmatic, interactive and,
therefore, precarious. Wildavsky’s advice to circumvent
the Law of large Solutions is a form of incrementalism.
(“the way to solve large social problems is to keep them
small”; Wildavsky, 1979, p. 63). In this spirit we argue
for a pragmatist approach to public innovation (Ansell,
2011; Bourgon, 2011). ‘Innovation’ is intrinsic to prac-
tices of governance. It can be triggered by ideals or fail-
ure, by crises, challenges or political expedience. But no
matter its impetus, it always involves a subsequent align-
ment of intention and consequence. Innovation is dis-
persed and socially distributed. Even if an identifiable
state actor triggers an innovation, it evolves through the
actions and reactions of a large number of actors. It
is not uncommon, as experiments in collaborative gov-
ernance demonstrate, that innovations emerge in the
civic sphere, and transfer to political society. In such a
situation a pragmatist approach to innovation involves
three “generative conditions” that facilitate ‘evolution-
ary learning”: a “problem-driven perspective”, reflexiv-
ity about the trajectory of our interventionist experi-
ences, and the necessity of deliberation, or the reciprocal
communication that is necessary for “adjudicating differ-
ences” between different actors, producing jointly con-
structed meanings and coordinating joint action (Ansell,
2011, pp. 11–12).
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